Desert Storm aims to examine the lessons of the Gulf War from a high-level, strategic defense perspective. It opens up an informed debate concerning the true military and geopolitical lessons of the conflict.

This book is the product of a continuing joint effort by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies to find roads to a lasting settlement of the dangerous intra-Korean confrontation.

From Saddam Hussein's first bold threats in 1990 to the stunning ground phase of Desert Storm in early 1991, the crisis in the Gulf captured the world's attention. This high-tech, low-cost war was televised nightly from beginning to end, accompanied by on-the-spot interpretations of strategy and its implications. But what did we learn from this crisis? Did the United States bungle its attempts at discouraging Saddam's aggressive actions, or is deterrence simply not a reliable foreign policy tool? Are chemical weapons truly the "poor man's atom bomb"? Does the war represent a good model for future crises, or did circumstances make this war more of an anomaly than a precedent? How did the ail-volunteer U.S. force perform? By combining exciting, detailed vignettes of the crisis with insightful discussions of its consequences, this book opens up an informed debate concerning the true military and geopolitical lessons of the conflict. Representing a distillation of the best thinking on defense and foreign policy in Washington, Desert Storm also incorporates the testimony of the inside players during the crisis-the people who actually planned and fought the war. Combining academic rigor and in-depth military expertise, the authors challenge the complacency of the emerging conventional wisdom regarding the conflict, taking us beyond mere chronicling and instant analysis to a riveting reenactment of the war and the serious consideration of its long-term implications.

This book is the product of a continuing joint effort by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies to find roads to a lasting settlement of the dangerous intra-Korean confrontation.

Leap of Faith is the first comprehensive and objective history of the decision to invade Iraq. Based on nine years of research, over 100 interviews with participants in the drama, and information from hundreds of U.S. and British declassified documents, Mike Mazarr shows how the most impressive and experienced foreign policy team made the greatest strategic folly of the century. Mazarr reveals that a combination of messianic certainty, cultural deference, and administrative infighting and incompetence allowed the decision to be made without any examination of the ways in which it could unravel. So when it did, no one had any answers. Leap of Faith is a parable of how good intentions can go wrong, and a cautionary tale about any international entanglement.

This book examines the role of risk management in the recent financial crisis and applies lessons from there to the national security realm. It rethinks the way risk contributes to strategy, with insights relevant to practitioners and scholars in national security as well as business. Over the past few years, the concept of risk has become one of the most commonly discussed issues in national security planning. And yet the experiences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis demonstrated critical limitations in institutional efforts to control risk. The most elaborate and complex risk procedures could not cure skewed incentives, cognitive biases, groupthink, and a dozen other human factors that led companies to take excessive risk. By embracing risk management, the national security enterprise may be turning to a discipline just as it has been discredited.

This book examines the role of risk management in the recent financial crisis and applies lessons from there to the national security realm. It rethinks the way risk contributes to strategy, with insights relevant to practitioners and scholars in national security as well as business. Over the past few years, the concept of risk has become one of the most commonly discussed issues in national security planning. And yet the experiences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis demonstrated critical limitations in institutional efforts to control risk. The most elaborate and complex risk procedures could not cure skewed incentives, cognitive biases, groupthink, and a dozen other human factors that led companies to take excessive risk. By embracing risk management, the national security enterprise may be turning to a discipline just as it has been discredited.

This manuscript examines the increasingly important form of rivalry and statecraft that has become known as "gray zone strategies." In regions from Eastern Europe to the South China Sea, such tactics in the hands of ambitious regional powers pose a growing challenge to U.S. and allied interests. This monograph aims to provide a broad introduction to the issue to help leaders in the U.S. Army and the wider joint Department of Defense and national security community better understand this challenge. Dr. Michael Mazarr, a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and Associate Program Director of the Army's Arroyo Center there, defines the issue, examines the most notable current cases of gray zone strategies, offers several hypotheses about the nature of this form of conflict, and suggests a number of policy responses. The monograph emphasizes that many gray zone tools and techniques have been employed for centuries.

This unique collection of essays explores the intricacies of how the Internet has changed the way we currently approach international security, civil society, and economic development. The contributors move past the conventional wisdom, tapping new and original sources to investigate new and unexpected developments. One essay explores how wiring Russia's nuclear scientists into the Internet increases the threat of weapons proliferation. Another looks at Internet-enabled development projects and, despite early success stories in Bangalore, India, explains why they will fail. Together the essays in this collection try to bring a dose of reality to the rose-colored futures many have predicted for world politics in the Information Age.

Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World sets out to examine one of the most pressing issues of the twenty-first century: the future of nuclear weapons. Acknowledging the growing consensus that pushing nuclear weapons to the margins of world politics would represent the wisest political and moral choice for the United States, a stellar group of scholars has been assembled in this volume to analyze one solution to the problem: virtual nuclear arsenals. First proposed by Jonathan Schell in his 1984 book The Abolition , this option involves removing all nuclear weapons from operational status and placing them in a dismantled, 'virtual' condition. Essays by many of the world's top experts on arms control and international relations combine to offer the first detailed assessment of what may be the most promising and provocative idea in the field today. Thorough, balanced, and probing, Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World opens the debate on a concept which could possibly determine the future of arms control and US policy.